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Abstract
We present a formal model of the MQ Telemetry Transport version 3.1 protocol
based on a timed message-passing process algebra. We explain the modelling
choices that we made, including pointing out ambiguities in the original pro-
tocol specification, and we carry out a static analysis of the formal protocol
model, which is based on an approximation of a name-substitution semantics
for algebra. The analysis reveals that the protocol behaves correctly as speci-
fied against the first two quality of service modes of operation providing at most
once and at least once delivery semantics to the subscribers. However, we find
that the third and highest quality of service semantics is prone to error and at
best ambiguous in certain aspects of its specification. Finally, we suggest an
enhancement of this level of QoS for the protocol.
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1. Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) [1] is a new paradigm with the aim of creating
connectivity for “everything” that can carry a minimum of storage and com-
putational power, such that these connected things can collaborate anytime,
anywhere and in any form, within applications in various domains such as per-
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sonal and social, transportation, enterprise businesses and service and utility
monitoring [2, 3]. Some recent estimates suggest that the number of IoT de-
vices exceeds 30 billion with more than 200 billion intermittent connections [4]
generating over 700B Euros in revenue by 2020 [5].
This connectivity of IoT devices has been boosted in recent times with the
increasing popularity of mobile communications, such as wireless sensor net-
works and radio frequency identification technologies, and the proliferation of
small hardware with minimum computational and storage capabalities. These
coupled with the standardisation efforts of Machine-to-Machine (M2M) com-
munication protocols, such as MQTT [6], XMPP [7] and others, meant that the
global vision of the IoT is well within reach of industries and their markets.
However, such global applications may require, in contexts where criticality is
an issue, a minimum degree of reliability in terms of the correctness of the
specification of the system as well as its level of assurance with respect to non-
functional properties such as security and privacy. Therefore, there is a need
for adopting formal analysis techniques to ensure that specifications are as little
ambiguous as possible leading to more reliable and robust applications built out
of those specifications.
This paper presents a formal model of the MQTT protocol above based on
a timed process algebra, called TPi, and then defines an abstract static analysis
that approximates the behaviour of processes by limiting the number of copies
of input variables and new names that can be captured in the analysis during
communications. The analysis is applied manually to the protocol to attempt
to understand how robust the behaviour of the protocol is in the different qual-
ity of service scenarios mentioned above. The main contribution of the paper
therefore is to formalise the specification of the MQTT protocol and to analysis
its semantics. Based on this analysis, the paper also makes recommendations
for future improvements of the protocol in order to remove current ambiguity
in its specification and enhance its dependability.
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1.1. The MQTT Protocol
The MQ Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol - version 3.1 [6] is described
as a lightweight broker-based publish/subscribe messaging protocol that was de-
signed to allow devices with small processing power and storage, such as those
which the IoT is composed of, to communicate over low-bandwidth and unre-
liable networks. The publish/subscribe message pattern [8], on which MQTT
is based, provides for one-to-many message distribution with three variaties of
delivery semantics, based on the level of quality of service expected from the
protocol.
In the “at most once” case, messages are delivered with the best effort of the
underlying communication infrastructure, which is usually IP-based, therefore
there is no guarantee that the message will arrive. This protocol, termed the
QoS = 0 protocol, is represented by the following flow of messages and actions:
Client→ Server : Publish
Server Action : Publish message to subscribers
In the second case of “at least once” semantics, certain mechanisms are incorpo-
rated to allow for message duplication, and despite the guarantee of delivering
the message, there is no guarantee that duplicates will be supressed. This case
is represented by the following flow of messages and actions:
Client→ Server : Publish
Client Action : Store Message
Server Actions : Store Message,
Publish message to subscribers,
Delete Message
Server→ Client : Puback
Client Action : Discard Message
The second message Puback represents an acknowledgement of the receipt of
the first message, and if Puback is lost, then the first message is retransmitted
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by the client (hence the reason why the message is stored at the client). Once
the protocol completes, the client discards the message. This protocol is also
known as the QoS = 1 protocol.
Finally, for the last case of “exactly once” delivery semantics, also known as
the QoS = 2 protocol, the published message is guaranteed to arrive only once
at the subscribers. This is represented by the following flow of messages and
actions:
Client→ Server : Publish
Client Action : Store Message
Server Actions : Store Message OR
Store Message ID,
Publish message to subscribers
Server→ Client : Pubrec
Client→ Server : Pubrel
Server Actions : Publish message to subscribers,
Delete Message OR
Delete Message ID
Server→ Client : Pubcomp
Client Action : Discard Message
In this protocol, Pubrec and Pubcomp represent acknowledgement messages
from the server, whereasPubrel is an acknowledgement message from the client.
The loss of Pubrec causes the client to recommence the protocol from its
beginning, whereas the loss of Pubcomp causes the client to retransmit only the
second part of the protocol, which starts at the Pubrel message. This additional
machinery presumably ensures a single delivery of the published message to the
subscribers.
The protocol additionally defines the message structure needed in commu-
nications between client, i.e. end-devices responsible for generating data from
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their domain (the data source) and servers, which are the system components
responsible for collating source data from clients/end-devices and distributing
these data to interested subscribers.
1.2. Paper Structure
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe related
work in current literature and in Section 3, we provide an overview of the TPi
process algebra, a timed version of the pi-calculus [9]. In Section 4, we develop a
model of the MQTT protocol based on TPi, and explain the various modelling
options that we adopted. In Section 5, we give an analysis of the protocol in
the context of its three versions of the delivery semantics. In Section 6, we
discuss the outcome of the analysis and make a recommendation towards the
enhancement of the MQTT protocol in the case of QoS = 2. Finally, in Section
7, we conclude the paper and provide directions for future research.
2. Related Work
Publish/subscribe is increasingly becoming an important communication
paradigm [16], in particular within the domain of sensor device networks and the
Internet-of-Things where messages can be communicated with more effeciency
and less consumption of the devices’ limited computatational power. IBM’s
MQTT-S protocol [17] was one of the first industrially backed lightweight pub-
lish/subscribe protocols that was deployed for wireless sensor and actuator net-
works. This was followed in year 2010 by version 3.1 [6], which is currently
undergoing standardisation by the OASIS community.
There has been very little effort in applying formal analysis tools to IoT
communication protocols, mainly due to the novelty of such protocols and their
very recent arrival at the scene of communication protocols. On the other hand,
some work has been done in the area of publish-subscribe protocols in general.
An early attempt in [18] was made to model formally publish/subscribe proto-
cols to capture their essential properties such as minimality and completeness,
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however, without any attempt to incorporate hostile environments within which
these protocols may run. One aspect of their model is the use of an incrementing
global clock T , similar to our concept of the function ð(P ), which is needed in
order to model the passing of time.
In [19], the authors define a formal model of publish/subscribe protocols,
within the domain of Grid computing, based on Petri-Nets. Their model offers
a mechanism for the composition of existing publish/subscribe protocols with
model, hence offering a friendly approach for the validation of such protocols.
Nonetheless, the focus of their work is mostly on Grid computing scenarios. The
work of [20] is an early attempt in discussing security properties and require-
ments desireable in publish/subscribe protocols, in particular within the domain
of Internet-based peer-to-peer systems, where such protocols became popular in
their early forms.
Several works, e.g. in [21, 22, 23, 24, 25], have adopted model checking as
an automated technique for verifying properties of systems to verify properties
related to reliability and correctness within the context of publish-subscribe sys-
tems, and various levels of effeciency. [21, 24] define a general frameworks for
model-checking publish-subscribe systems, without focusing on specific systems
or properties. Their approach is more general than ours, though our approach
is more effecient since it handles only one class of pub-sub systems (MQTT)
and targets one type of properties. The approach of [22] is closer to our ap-
proach in that they adopt a specific system, thinkteam, as the target for their
analysis. [23] propose a dedicated model checking technique to verify properties
of publish/subscribe-based Message Oriented Middleware (MOM) systems.
Another close work to ours is that of [25], where probabilistic model checking
is used to capture uncertainties inherent in publish-subscribe systems. However,
despite also being stochastic in nature and hence similar to the TPi language we
adopt here, a major difference is that they use probabilities rather than time as
a means of expressing that some communications probably may not take place.
On the same note, probabilistic model checking is also used in [26] to analyse
quality of predictions in service-oriented architectures.
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Within the domain of sensor network protocols, there is more focus of effort
on the formal analysis and verification of such protocols. For example, in [27],
the authors apply model checking techniques in the verification of a medium
access control protocol called LMAC. Similarly, in [28] propose a formal model
of flooding and gossiping protocols for analysing their performance probabilisitic
properties. More recently, [29] proposed a formal model and analysis of clock-
synchronised protocols in sensor networks based on timed automata.
An earlier version of this paper appeared in [30], where a formal analysis
of the delivery semantics of the MQTT protocol was presented. The analysis
identified the anomalies in the case of QoS = 2, which showed that the “exactly
once” delivery was not always guaranteed. The current paper extends the pre-
vious work by reporting on the updates the case of QoS = 2 resulted for the
MQTT standard in its 3.1.1 version [31], where the QoS = 2 flow of messages
was updated to reflect the results of this work and to remove the ambiguity
of its QoS = 2 delivery semantics. The current paper, beside covering a more
detailed literature review, also provides more detail on the analysis and suggests
improvements to the protocol.
3. TPi: A timed Process Algebra
The model of MQTT that we introduce here is based on a process algebra
called TPi, originally inspired by [10] and further developed in [11], which is a
synchronous message-passing calculus capabale of expressing timed inputs.
3.1. Syntax and Structural Operational Semantics of TPi
The syntax of the language defines processes, P,Q ∈ P, based on names
x, y ∈ N as follows:
P,Q ::= x〈y〉.P | timert(x(y).P,Q) | !P | (νx)P | (P | Q) | (P +
Q) | 0 | A(x)
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The syntax corresponds to that of the standard synchronous pi-calculus [9] ex-
cept for the fact that input actions are placed within a timer, timert(x(y).P,Q),
where t ∈ N represents a time bound. The input action, x(y).P , can synchronise
with suitable output actions as long as t > 0. Otherwise, when t = 0, the timer
behaves as Q. There is an assumption that t is decremented by the environment
of the process and that t can be any time unit (e.g. tick, second etc.). Finally,
we utilised process definition calls in the form of A(x). This calls a process
definition A(y)
def
= P , and at the same time, passes it the value x to replace y.
If the definition A does not accept any input parameters, then we simply omit
the input parameter y and write A()
def
= P .
The structural operational semantics of TPi are given in terms of the struc-
tural congruence, ≡, and labelled transition, µ−→, relations as shown in Figure
1, where fn(P ) represents the set of free names of P .
The definition of ≡ is standard, except for rules (6), (7), (8) and (9), which
deal with expired and infinite timers, and parameterised/non-parameterised pro-
cess definition calls, respectively. The labels, µ ∈ {x〈y〉−→, x(y)−→, x(z)−→, τ−→}, express
free and bound outputs, inputs and silent actions. Again, most of the rules for
µ−→ are straightforward and their explanation can be found elsewhere (e.g. [12,
§3.2.2] and [11]) except for rule (19), where a time-stepping function, ð : P → P,
expresses the ticking of activated timers (i.e. timed inputs that are already at
the head of the process waiting to accept a message) by the external environ-
ment of the process:
ð(P ) =

timert(x(y).Q,Q′), if P = timert+1(x(y).Q,Q′)
and 0 < t+ 1 <∞
ð(Q) | ð(R), if P = Q | R
ð(Q) + ð(R), if P = Q+R
(νx)ð(Q), if P = (νx)Q
ð(Q[x/y]), if P = A(x) and A(y) def= Q
ð(Q), if P = A() and A() def= Q
P, otherwise
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Rules of the ≡ relation:
(1) (P/ ≡, |,0) is a commutative monoid
(2) (νx)0 ≡ 0
(3) (νx)(νy)P ≡ (νy)(νx)P
(4) !P ≡ P |!P
(5) (νx)(P | Q) ≡ (P | (νx)Q) if x /∈ fn(Q)
(6) timer0(x(z).P,Q) ≡ Q
(7) timer∞(x(z).P,Q) ≡ x(z).P
(8) A(x) ≡ P [x/y], where A(y) def= P
(9) A() ≡ P , where A() def= P
Rules of the
µ−→ relation:
(10) x〈y〉.P x〈y〉−→ P
(11) timert+1(x(z).P,Q)
x(z)−→ P
(12) P
x〈y〉−→Q ⇒ (νy)P x(y)−→Q if x 6= y
(13) P
x〈y〉−→ P ′, Q x(z)−→Q′ ⇒ P | Q τ−→ P ′ | Q′[y/z]
(14) P
x(y)−→ P ′, Q x(z)−→Q′ ⇒ P | Q τ−→ (νy)(P ′ | Q′[y/z])
(15) P
µ−→Q ⇒ (νx)P µ−→ (νx)Q if x 6= fn(µ)
(16) P
µ−→ P ′ ⇒ P | Q µ−→ P ′ | Q
(17) P
µ−→ P ′ ⇒ P +Q µ−→ P ′
(18) P
µ−→ P ′ ⇒ Q+ P µ−→ P ′
(19) P
τ−→ ð(P )
Figure 1: The structural operational semantics of TPi [11].
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This function reduces the timer’s value as long as that value is still a positive
number, expressed as t+ 1. The function distributes over parallel composition,
non-deterministic choice, restrictions and process definition calls, but it has no
effect over all other processes. This is interesting for the cases of output and
replicated processes since these are considered to be non-active unless they are
synchronised or replicated. We assume that rule (19) is applied once every
unit of time and that its application (including the call to the ð function) is
completed before a single unit of time elapses.
In [11], we defined a non-standard name-substitution semantics for TPi,
which when abstracted using an approximation function, was capable of yielding
an abstract environment φ : N ] → ℘(N ]) ∈ D]⊥, where N ] represents the set of
abstract names. Unlike N , N ] is finite and as a result, ℘(N ]) is also finite. The
resulting domain, D]⊥, guarantees termination for an abstract interpretation
computed over it, such as that defined in [11]. Finally, ⊥D] = φ0 is the empty
environment where ∀x ∈ N : φ0(x) = {}. We also defined in [11] an abstract
interpretation based on D]⊥, which was shown to be safe with respect to the
name-substitution semantics, in similar fashion to previous analyses we defined
for different variations of the pi-calculus [12, 13, 14]. Later in Section 5, we apply
this abstract interpretation to the model of the MQTT protocol introduced in
the next Section 4.
4. A Model of MQTTv3.1
We now define a model of the MQTT protocol in TPi as shown in Figure
2, which captures the client/server protocol messages. Although the protocol
also describes messages between the server and the subscribers, we only focus
on one aspect of these, which is the initial publish message from the server to
the subscribers.
The model expresses three protocols, one for each of the three levels of the
quality of service specified in [6].
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QoS Level 0 Protocol:
Client(Publish) | Server(), where:
Client(z)
def
= c〈z〉
Server()
def
= c(x).pub〈x〉
QoS Level 1 Protocol:
Client(Publish) | Server(), where:
Client(z)
def
= c〈z〉.timert(c′(y),Client(PublishDUP ))
Server()
def
= !c(x).pub〈x〉.c′〈Puback〉
QoS Level 2 Protocol:
Client(Publish) | Server(), where:
Client(z)
def
= c〈z〉.timert(c(y).ClientCont(y),Client(PublishDUP ))
ClientCont(u)
def
= c′〈Pubrelu〉.timert′(c′(w),ClientCont(u))
Server()
def
= !c(l).(ServerLate(l) + ServerEarly(l))
ServerLate(x)
def
= (c〈Pubrecx〉.c′(v).pub〈x〉.c′〈Pubcompv〉.
!(c′(v′).c′〈Pubcompv′〉))
ServerEarly(x)
def
= (pub〈x〉.c〈Pubrecx〉.c′(q).c′〈Pubcompq〉.
!(c′(q′).c′〈Pubcompq′〉))
Figure 2: A model of MQTTv3.1 in TPi considering the three levels of QoS.
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4.1. The Subscribers
Our model of the subscribers is minimal, since we only care about the first
step in their behaviour, which is listening to the published messages announced
by the server:
Subscriber()
def
= !pub(x′)
This definition does not care about what happens to the message after it has
been read by the subscriber on the channel pub. The main reason for including
the replication, !, is to allow for the possibility of accepting multiple messages
from the server. This will allow us later in the analysis to validate the different
delivery semantics associated with the MQTTv3.1 protocol. The definition can
capture the number of times the subscriber will read a message within a single
run of the protocol since each instance of x′ spawned under the replication is
renamed with the labeling system x′1, x
′
2, etc. (following [15]). The definition
also assumes that the subscriber can wait ad infinitum for a message to be
published by the server, and if no such message is published, it will do nothing.
This is not realistic, but sufficient for our purpose here.
4.2. The Attacker
The attacker in our case has a very primitive role, which is to offer the
possibility of consuming the exchanged messages in the protocol. In fact, the
attacker is only interested in disrupting messages between the client and the
server. Therefore, its definition is to listen continuously on the channels c and
c′ over which the client and the server communicate:
Attacker()
def
= !(c(y′) + c′(u′))
Similar to the case of the subscribers, the attacker is not in a rush to obtain an
input from the protocol, therefore it can wait ad infinitum for a message to be
received on its channels c or c′. It is also possible to run a finite attacker model
as follows:
Attacker()
def
= (c(y′1) + c
′(u′1)) | . . . | (c(y′n) + c′(u′n))
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Where the operator ! is replaced by a finite number n of the input choices
all composed in parallel. In this finite model, the attacker is capable of only
consuming n messages.
5. Analysis of the Protocol
We now define formally the three message-delivery semantics associated with
the MQTT protocol, at most once, at least once and exactly once delivery, and
we discuss the results of analysing the protocol in light of these three semantics.
5.1. QoS = 0 Protocol
The model of QoS = 0 protocol is straightforward. The client process is
called from the top level protocol with the Publish message. This process is
then run in parallel with the server process, which upon receiving the Publish
message, it publishes it on the pub channel where interested subscribers are lis-
tening. For simplicity, we assume that the message is published as is. However,
a more refined (but not of interest to us) server process would be expected to
extract the relevant payload from Publish before publishing the actual data. We
formalise the semantics of the protocol for the case of QoS = 0 in terms of the
following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Delivery Semantics For QoS = 0). The MQTTv3.1 protocol
for the case of QoS = 0 has a delivery semantics of the publish message to the
subscribers of “at most once”.
Proof. Given the definition of the subscribers’ process in the previous section,
a run of this protocol would be equivalent to the following in the absence of
any attackers: (Client(Publish) | Server() | Subscriber()). Analysing the process
renders the following value of Φ:
φ = {x 7→ {Publish}, x′1 7→ {Publish}}
From this, we can see that the message arrives at the subscriber. However, if
we re-run the analysis with the attacker process activated: (Client(Publish) |
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Server() | Subscriber() | Attacker()), we obtain the following interesting out-
come:
φatk = {y′1 7→ {Publish}}
This case shows a run of the protocol, which leads to only y′ being instantiated
with Publish. There is no instantiation of the x or x′ variables.
From these results, it is easy to see that there are two possible outcomes.
The first value of φ represents a normal run where x′ 7→ {Publish}, whereas in
the second value of φatk, we have that x
′ 7→ {} by the definition of the default
state φ0. Hence, it is straightforward to see that the protocol may deliver the
published message to the subscribers, and therefore, it correctly exhibits the at
most once delivery semantics.  In this case, we
do not gain more information about the protocol if we were analysing for the
case of k > 1 since the definition of the protocol in Figure 2 does not contain
replicatin, which prevents it from being able to interact with an attacker that
generates more messages (i.e. a spammy rather than a lossy attacker). Another
noteworthy point is related to modelling the attacker as one that would emit at
least one message. In the case of QoS=0, this would have the same effect as the
no-attacker case above.
5.2. QoS = 1 Protocol
The QoS = 1 protocol has a semantics of “at least once” delivery. We model
this in Figure 2 as a client process, which starts by sending a Publish message
to the server. The server is capable of inputting this message, publishing it to
the subscribers and then replying back to the client with the Puback message.
Again, for simplicity, we abstract away from the structure of both Publish and
Puback, and point out here that a more refined treatment of these messages (i.e.
extracting their payload) does not affect our analysis in the paper.
The next part is the main difference from the QoS = 0 case above. The
client will wait for a finite amount of time, t, on its input channel c′ for the
Puback message from the server. If this message delays (for any communication
failing reason), the client will choose to re-call its process with a new PublishDUP
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message. The difference between PublishDUP and Publish is that the DUP bit
is set in the former to indicate that it is a duplication of the latter. The server
on its side is capable of receiving this new publish message since its behaviour
is replicated, which means that it can restart its process any number of times
required by the context.
The two channels, c and c′, distinguish between the two parts of the protocol
(Publish and Puback parts). This is not necessary in practice, however it renders
our model much simpler by avoiding unnecessary interferences between these
two parts. In practice, there would be some message validation mechanisms to
prevent such interferences occuring.
We formalise the delivery semantics for this protocol in terms of the following
theorem.
Theorem 2 (Delivery Semantics For QoS = 1). The MQTTv3.1 protocol
for the case of QoS = 1 has a delivery semantics of the publish message to the
subscribers of “at least once”.
Proof. Again, we first analyse the protocol under no attackers. In this case, we
find the following subset value for φ:
φ = {x1 7→ {Publish}, y 7→ {Puback}, x′1 7→ {Publish}}
This implies normal behaviour, where the published message eventually arrives
at the subscriber only once. We now re-run the analysis with the attacker acti-
vated, which produces the following subset value of φatk, where k is set to 3 to
allow three runs of the protocol to take place:
φatk = {x1 7→ {Publish}, u′1 7→ {Puback}, x′1 7→ {Publish},
x2 7→ {PublishDUP }, u′2 7→ {Puback},
x′2 7→ {PublishDUP }, x3 7→ {PublishDUP },
u′3 7→ {Puback}, x′3 7→ {PublishDUP }}
The first subset of name substitutions corresponds to the first run where the
attacker interferes with the protocol by consuming the Puback message. In the
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next two subsets, the client will issue a duplicate PublishDUP . In both of these
subsets, the attacker continues to consume the acknowledgement message and
the client will continue to restart the protocol. Examining these results, we can
easily see that the subscribers’ input x′ has more than one instantiation of the
message Publish, including when the DUP bit is set. This indicates that the
message may arrive more than once at the subscriber. 
In the above case of QoS=1, it was suffecient to go up to 3 copies to prove that
duplicates will happen. Setting k > 3 also generates more copies and therefore
more duplicates. This can be shown as a result of the safety of the analysis,
as was proven in [12, 13, 14, 15]. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that for
the case of QoS=1, we never obtain a result where the number of published
messages is zero (under either condition of no attacker/attacker).
Again here, it is worth noting that modelling an attacker as one that would
emit at least one message would always push the number of k by one (i.e. k = 4),
since the effect of such a behaviour is equivalent to the no-attacker case, albeit
that only one message is allowed through.
5.3. QoS = 2 Protocol
The last protocol represents the highest quality of service level, indicated by
the QoS bit setting of 2. The model of Figure 2 contains again the definitions
of the client and the publishing server. Similar to (and for the same reasons
above) for the case of QoS = 1, we use two channels for the client: c for the
first part ending with the sending of Pubrec and c′ for the second part ending
with the seding of Pubcomp.
The client process has two parts. The first could be re-iterated, which will
result in the Publish message being re-sent with the DUP bit set in case the
Pubrec message is not received from the server within a time bound of t units.
Note here that the standard protocol of [6] is not clear regarding the resent
message. There is no explicit mentioning that the resent publish message is
considered different from the original one. The assumption we make is that
since DUP is set, then the resent message is a “duplicate” of the original one
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and therefore it is the same message.
The second part of the client process, ClientCont, is instantiated by the first
part only if Pubrec is received from the server within the time bound t. In this
case, it will send a Pubrel message to the server parameterised by the same
message id as received in the previous message (hence we write Pubrelu). After
this, it waits for an amount of time t′ for the last message from the server,
Pubcomp, at which point it terminates once this message is received. If this last
message does not arrive within the time bound t′, it will re-call itself (i.e. the
ClientCont part), which will result in the re-commencement of the protocol from
the point of the sending of the Pubrelu message. We believe the above two timed
input actions model adequately the requirement ”If a failure is detected, or after
a defined time period, the protocol flow is retried from the last unacknowledged
protocol message; either the PUBLISH or PUBREL.“ [6, pp. 38].
Finally, the last part of the protocol represents the server process. This
process after receiving the initial publish message splits into a choice of two
processes, ServerEarly and ServerLate. The main difference between these is
whether the publish message is published to the subscribers before (i.e. early)
or after (i.e. late) sending the second message of the protocol Pubrecx, which is
parameterised by the message id received in the first message from the client.
The standard provides two alternative options for this case [6, pp. 38]. The
first follows the sequence of actions (store message, publish message and delete
message), whereas the second follows the sequence of actions (store message
id, publish message and delete message id). We term the former a late publish
semantics and the latter an early publish semantics. The standard’s document
states that “The choice of semantic is implementation specific and does not affect
the guarantees of a QoS level 2 flow” [6, pp. 38], however, we demonstrate next
in terms of the output of our static analysis later that this is not generally true.
The whole server process is replicated in order to be able to receive a repeat
publish message from the client in the event that Pubrecx is not received at the
client within the time limit.
The server process, after sending Pubrecx, goes into the second part of the
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protocol. In this part, it listens on c′(v) or c′(q) for the incoming Pubrel message
from the client. It then continues depending on the choice made earlier to either
publish the message and send Pubcompv or just send Pubcompq. In both cases,
the Pubcomp message is parameterised by the message id from the received
Pubrel message from the client.
The final part now commences, which is a replicated process that again
listens for the Pubrel message from the client, and once this is received, it sends
another Pubcomp message back to the client. This last part of the server process
is similar in both sides of the choice and it will replicate itself until the client
receives successfully the Pubcomp message, at which point the client will cease
re-sending Pubrel messages.
It is worth noting here that our model above assumes that the implementa-
tion of the server will cater for a non-deterministic choice of both the early and
late publish semantics. However, it is also possible, as we shall see in the next
section, to model and analyse the server assuming only one of the two semantics
of message publishing is implemented. This would be equivalent to modelling
the server process as either !c(l).ServerLate(l) or !c(l).ServerEarly(l).
We now capture the delivery semantics for this protocol in terms of the
following property.
Property 1 (Delivery Semantics For QoS = 2). The MQTTv3.1 protocol
for the case of QoS = 2 has a delivery semantics of the publish message to the
subscribers of exactly once. 
In the first analysis we run, the attacker is deactivated. We obtain the following
subset value for Φ when k = 1:
φ = {x1 7→ {Publish}, y 7→ {Pubrecx}, v1 7→ {Pubrelu}, x′1 7→ {Publish}, w 7→
{Pubcompv}, x1 7→ {Publish}, x′1 7→ {Publish}, y 7→ {Pubrecx}, q1 7→ {Pubrelu},
w 7→ {Pubcompq}, . . .}
The substitutions correspond to normal runs of the protocol for the two choices
18
of the late and early publish semantics. Now, let’s examine some of the results
of the static analysis when the attacker is activated. In particular, we consider
the case of the early publish semantics where we analyse in the context of the
server !c(l).ServerEarly(l) and the simple attacker model (c(y′) + c′(u′)). We
obtain the following interesting subset of the results, with k = 2:
φatk1 = {x1 7→ {Publish}, x′1 7→ {Publish}, y′1 7→ {Pubrecx}, x2 7→ {PublishDUP },
x′2 7→ {PublishDUP }, y 7→ {Pubrecx}, q1 7→ {Pubrelu}, w 7→ {Pubcompq}, . . .}
The result is interesting, as it represents a single interference case by the attacker
(since k = 2). The attacker manages to consume the Pubrec message (y′1 7→
{Pubrecx}) before the client does so. As a result, the first part of the protocol is
repeated and hence, in addition to the initial publish message (x′1 7→ {Publish}),
this leads to a second instance of this message to be annouced to the subscribers
(x′2 7→ {PublishDUP ).
Next, we re-apply the analysis on the case of the full server model and the
simple non-replicated attacker model, where again we set k = 2 for simplicity:
φatk2 = {x1 7→ {Publish}, x′1 7→ {Publish}, y′1 7→ {Pubrecx}, x2 7→ {PublishDUP },
y 7→ {Pubrecx}, v1 7→ {Pubrelu}, x′2 7→ {PublishDUP }, w 7→ {Pubcompv}, . . .}
This represents another case of the attacker interfering with the protocol, how-
ever unlike the case of the first attack, a different choice of the publish semantics
is made here in terms of the re-transmission of first part of the protocol. Here, we
find that the Pubrecx acknowledgement message sent by the server is captured
by the attacker after an early publish semantics choice is taken involving an-
nouncing the publish message to the subscribers (by means of x′1 7→ {Publish}).
This failure in delivering Pubrecx to the client causes a restart of the protocol,
however, in this case a different choice is made with the late publish semantics.
Continuing with this run, the second part of the protocol causes the duplicated
publish message PublishDUP to be announced again to the subscribers. Note
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that this attack would not be possible if either ServerLate or ServerEarly pro-
cess only is adopted, but not a choice of both.
6. Discussion
Considering the results of the above three analyses, we find that the protocol
as described in [6] and specified in Section 4 is quite sound in the cases of QoS =
0 and QoS = 1, however in the case of QoS = 2, the protocol description in [6] is
ambiguous in terms of how the server is supposed to deal with the publication
of duplicated messages and whether it may or may not implement both choices
of early and late publish semantics.
More specifically, considering the two results of φatk1 and φatk2 for the case
of QoS = 2, we conclude that there is more than one scenario where the pro-
tocol fails in adhering to its “exactly once” delivery semantics and where Pub-
lish/PublishDUP are delivered to the subscribers more than once. As a result,
Property 1 defined in the previous section does not hold. It is also noteworthy
that this failure occurs only due to more-than-once delivery reasons, and there
is no case where the failure occurs due to less-than-once (i.e. zero) delivery,
unless we assume a powerful attacker with replicated inputs whose capable of
continuously blocking the Pubrec message from being delivered to the client.
We propose here the following two enhancements to the MQTT protocol
in the case of QoS = 2. First, separate the implementation of the early and
late publish semantics. This is currently not explicit in the specification of the
protocol in [6]. We suggest that this be made explicit, if this is the intention,
so that implementations of the protocol are not confused with the choice.
The second enhancement is to introduce a conditional guard on the publish-
ing action at the server side, for both choices of early and late publish semantics.
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This can be described as the following udpated QoS = 2 protocol:
Client→ Server : Publish
Client Action : Store Message
Server Actions : Store Message OR
Store Message ID,
([¬Published(Message ID)]Publish message to subscribers)
Server→ Client : Pubrec
Client→ Server : Pubrel
Server Actions : ([¬Published(Message)]Publish message to subscribers),
Delete Message
OR Delete Message ID
Server→ Client : Pubcomp
Client Action : Discard Message
Where Published(Message) is a predicate on the local state of the server in
which the message or its id is stored. This predicate checks whether a mes-
sage has already been published. We also overload the predicate in the case of
Published(Message ID) to check whether a message corresponding to an ID has
been already published or not. If this predicate is not true, the publish action
is neglected and the next action in line is applied.
In order to incorporate the predicate Published(Message) in our TPi-based
specification, we need to modify the syntax of the language to include a new
term P / p . Q, where p is any local predicate, which is True, the process will
evaluate as P and if False, it will evaluate as Q. The structural operational
semantics of this can more formally be expressed by adding two additional rules
to the ≡ relation in Figure 1 as follows:
(10) P / p . Q ≡ P if p = True
(11) P / p . Q ≡ Q if p = False
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This will then lead to the redefinition of the early and late publish semantics
specification to include the additional expected conditional predicate, published(x),
as shown in Figure 3.
Client(z)
def
= c〈z〉.timert(c(y).ClientCont(y),Client(PublishDUP ))
ClientCont(u)
def
= c′〈Pubrelu〉.timert′(c′(w),ClientCont(u))
Server()
def
= !c(l).(ServerLate(l) + ServerEarly(l))
ServerLate(x)
def
= c〈Pubrecx〉.c′(v).
(pub〈x〉.c′〈Pubcompv〉.!(c′(v′).c′〈Pubcompv′〉)) / (¬ published(x)).
(c′〈Pubcompv〉.!(c′(v′).c′〈Pubcompv′〉))
ServerEarly(x)
def
=
pub〈x〉.c〈Pubrecx〉.c′(q).c′〈Pubcompq〉.!(c′(q′).c′〈Pubcompq′〉)
/(¬ published(x)) . c〈Pubrecx〉.c′(q).c′〈Pubcompq〉.
!(c′(q′).c′〈Pubcompq′〉)
Figure 3: The modified model for the case of QoS = 2.
We assume that the predicate is able to consider the contents of the param-
eter x containing the message and its id. Repeating the analysis for the case of
the presence of the attacker and for the early and late publish semantics renders
the following two subsets of the final φ environment:
φatk1 = {x1 7→ {Publish}, x′1 7→ {Publish}, y′1 7→ {Pubrecx}, x2 7→ {PublishDUP },
y 7→ {Pubrecx}, q1 7→ {Pubrelu}, w 7→ {Pubcompq}, . . .}
φatk2 = {x1 7→ {Publish}, x′1 7→ {Publish}, y′1 7→ {Pubrecx}, x2 7→ {PublishDUP },
y 7→ {Pubrecx}, v1 7→ {Pubrelu}, w 7→ {Pubcompv}, . . .}
Both of which clearly show no instantiation of the second and further copies
of the x′ input variable for the subscriber process, in which case we assume that
the modification of Figure 3 achieves its intended aim.
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7. Conclusion and Future Work
We have modelled and analysed in this paper the MQ Telemetry Transport
version 3.1 protocol, which is a lightweight broker-based publish subscribe pro-
tocol that is used in communications with small devices that exhibit limited
computational and storage power.
We found that the first two QoS modes of operation in the protocol are
clearly specified and their message delivery semantics to subscribers can be
easily verified to hold. However, according to the results of the analysis, the
last case of an “exactly once” delivery semantics has potential vulnerabilities
where a simple attacker model that adheres to the specified threat model of the
protocol can cause the semantics to be undermined. At best, this semantics is
vaguely specified in the standard [6], particularly in relation to issues to do with
the choice of server-side behaviour.
Future research will be focused on studying the properties of the protocol
under more aggressive attacker models and we plan to propose refined versions
of the protocol, including the use of lightweight cryptography in scenarios where
authentication of the small devices is required. In addition, although we car-
ried out a simple modification to the QoS = 2 case that removes the duplicated
publish message vulnerability, we would like to further investigate in-depth addi-
tional mechanisms for improving further the protocol. This would call for more
automated approaches, namely using any of a number of automated verification
tools that exist in literature, e.g. [32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37]
References
[1] J. Gubbi, R. Buyya, S. Marusic, M. Palaniswami, Internet of Things (IoT):
A Vision, Architectural Elements, and Future Directions, Future Gener.
Comput. Syst. 29 (7) (2013) 1645–1660.
[2] L. Atzori, A. Iera, G. Morabito, The Internet of Things: A Survey, Comput.
Netw. 54 (15) (2010) 2787–2805.
23
[3] D. Bandyopadhyay, J. Sen, Internet of Things: Applications and Chal-
lenges in Technology and Standardization, Wireless Personal Communica-
tions 58 (1) (2011) 49–69.
[4] O. Vermesan, P. Friess, Internet of Things: Converging Technologies for
Smart Environments and Integrated Ecosystems, The River Publishers,
2013.
[5] O. Mazhelis, H. Warma, S. Leminen, P. Ahokangas, P. Pussinen, M. Ra-
jahonka, R. Siuruainen, H. Okkonen, A. Shveykovskiy, J. Myllykoski,
Internet-of-Things Market, Value Networks, and Business Models: State
of the Art Report, Tech. Rep. TR-39 (2013).
[6] D. Locke, MQ Telemetry Transport (MQTT) V3.1 Protocol Specification
(2010).
[7] P. Saint-Andre, K. Smith, R. Tronon, XMPP: The Definitive Guide Build-
ing Real-Time Applications with Jabber Technologies, O’Reilly Media, Inc.,
2009.
[8] K. Birman, T. Joseph, Exploiting Virtual Synchrony in Distributed Sys-
tems, SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev. 21 (5) (1987) 123–138.
[9] R. Milner, J. Parrow, D. Walker, A Calculus of Mobile Processes, Informa-
tion and Computation 100(1) (1992) 1–77.
[10] M. Berger, K. Honda, The Two-Phase Commitment Protocol in an Ex-
tended Pi-Calculus, Electronic Notes in Theoretical Comp. Science 39 (1).
[11] B. Aziz and G. Hamilton, Detecting Man-in-the-Middle Attacks by Precise
Timing, in: Proceedings of the 2009 Third International Conference on
Emerging Security Information, Systems and Technologies, SECURWARE
’09, IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC, USA, 2009, pp. 81–86.
[12] B. Aziz, A static analysis framework for security properties in mobile and
cryptographic systems, Ph.D. thesis, School of Computing, Dublin City
University, Dublin, Ireland (2003).
24
[13] B. Aziz, G. Hamilton, D. Gray, A static analysis of cryptographic processes:
The denotational approach, Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming
64(2) (2005) 285–320.
[14] B. Aziz, G. Hamilton, The modelling and analysis of pki-based systems
using process calculi, International Journal of Foundations of Computer
Science 18(3) (2007) 593–618.
[15] B. Aziz, G. Hamilton, A Privacy Analysis for the pi-calculus: The Denota-
tional Approach, in: Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on the Specification,
Analysis and Validation for Emerging Technologies, no. 94 in Datalogiske
Skrifter, Roskilde University, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2002.
[16] A. J. Stanford-Clark, G. R. Wightwick, The Application of Pub-
lish/Subscribe Messaging to Environmental, Monitoring, and Control Sys-
tems, IBM J. Res. Dev. 54 (4) (2010) 396–402.
[17] U. Hunkeler, H. L. Truong, A. Stanford-Clark, MQTT-S - A pub-
lish/subscribe protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks, in: Proceedings of
the Third International Conference on COMmunication System softWAre
and MiddlewaRE (COMSWARE 2008), IEEE, 2008, pp. 791–798.
[18] R. Baldoni, M. Contenti, S. T. Piergiovanni, A. Virgillito, Modelling Pub-
lish/Subscribe Communication Systems: Towards a Formal Approach, in:
8th IEEE International Workshop on Object-Oriented Real-Time Depend-
able Systems (WORDS 2003), IEEE Computer Society, 2003, pp. 304–311.
[19] L. Abidi, C. Cerin, S. Evangelista, A Petri-Net Model for the Publish-
Subscribe Paradigm and Its Application for the Verification of the Bon-
jourGrid Middleware, in: Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE International Con-
ference on Services Computing, SCC ’11, IEEE Computer Society, Wash-
ington, DC, USA, 2011, pp. 496–503.
[20] C. Wang, A. Carzaniga, D. Evans, A. Wolf, Security Issues and Re-
quirements for Internet-Scale Publish-Subscribe Systems, in: Proceedings
25
of the 35th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
(HICSS’02)-Volume 9 - Volume 9, HICSS ’02, IEEE Computer Society,
Washington, DC, USA, 2002, pp. 303–.
[21] D. Garlan, S. Khersonsky, J. S. Kim, Model checking publish-subscribe
systems, in: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Model
Checking Software, SPIN’03, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2003, pp.
166–180.
[22] M. H. ter Beek, M. Massink, D. Latella, S. Gnesi, A. Forghieri, M. Sebastia-
nis, Model checking publish/subscribe notification for thinkteam &#174;,
Electron. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci. 133 (2005) 275–294.
[23] Y. Jia, E. L. Bodanese, C. I. Phillips, J. Bigham, R. Tao, Improved reli-
ability of large scale publish/subscribe based moms using model checking,
in: 2014 IEEE Network Operations and Management Symposium, NOMS
2014, Krakow, Poland, May 5-9, 2014, IEEE, 2014, pp. 1–8.
[24] L. Baresi, C. Ghezzi, L. Mottola, On accurate automatic verification of
publish-subscribe architectures, in: Proceedings of the 29th International
Conference on Software Engineering, ICSE ’07, IEEE Computer Society,
Washington, DC, USA, 2007, pp. 199–208.
[25] F. He, L. Baresi, C. Ghezzi, P. Spoletini, Formal analysis of publish-
subscribe systems by probabilistic timed automata, in: Formal Techniques
for Networked and Distributed Systems - FORTE 2007, 27th IFIP WG 6.1
International Conference, Tallinn, Estonia, June 27-29, 2007, Proceedings,
Vol. 4574, Springer, 2007, pp. 247–262.
[26] S. Gallotti, C. Ghezzi, R. Mirandola, G. Tamburrelli, Quality prediction of
service compositions through probabilistic model checking, in: Proceedings
of the 4th International Conference on Quality of Software-Architectures:
Models and Architectures, QoSA ’08, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg,
2008, pp. 119–134.
26
[27] A. Fehnker, L. V. Hoesel, A. Mader, Modelling and Verification of the
LMAC Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks, in: Proceedings of the 6th
International Conference on Integrated Formal Methods, IFM’07, Springer-
Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2007, pp. 253–272.
[28] A. Fehnker, P. Gao, Formal Verification and Simulation for Performance
Analysis for Probabilistic Broadcast Protocols, in: Proceedings of the
5th International Conference on Ad-Hoc, Mobile, and Wireless Networks,
ADHOC-NOW’06, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2006, pp. 128–141.
[29] F. Heidarian, J. Schmaltz, F. W. Vaandrager, Analysis of a clock synchro-
nization protocol for wireless sensor networks, Theor. Comput. Sci. 413 (1)
(2012) 87–105.
[30] B. Aziz, A formal model and analysis of the mq telemetry transport pro-
tocol, in: 9th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Se-
curity (ARES 2014), Fribourg, Switzerland, IEEE, 2014.
[31] A. Banks, R. Gupta, MQ Telemetry Transport (MQTT) V3.1.1 Protocol
Specification: Committee Specification Draft 02 / Public Review Draft 02
(2014).
[32] ProVerif: Cryptographic protocol verifier in the formal model,
http://prosecco.gforge.inria.fr/personal/bblanche/proverif/, accessed: 24-
09-2014.
[33] D. A. Basin, S. Mo¨dersheim, L. Vigano`, OFMC: A symbolic model checker
for security protocols, Int. J. Inf. Sec. 4 (3) (2005) 181–208.
[34] The Tamarin prover for security protocol analysis,
https://hackage.haskell.org/package/tamarin-prover, accessed: 24-09-
2014.
[35] Maude-NPA, http://maude.cs.uiuc.edu/tools/Maude-NPA/, accessed: 24-
09-2014.
27
[36] Casper: A Compiler for the Analysis of Security Protocols,
http://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/gavin.lowe/Security/Casper/, accessed: 24-
09-2014.
[37] The Scyther Tool, http://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/people/cas.cremers/scyther/index.html,
accessed: 24-09-2014.
28
